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Abstract:  This article explores the carrying out of Pakistan’s first (1951) census from the 
perspective of contemporary developments in the southern province of Sindh.  Conducted 
against the backdrop of Partition-related migration to and from the province, this attempt at 
population enumeration proved to be a mammoth bureaucratic undertaking on the part of the 
recently-created Pakistani state.  The challenges that this exercise posed at the provincial 
level shed light on processes of attempted nation-building, as well as the centrality of 
population counting to the biopolitical management of citizenship, during a key period of 
transition in mid-twentieth century Sindh. 
 
 
 
…the Pakistan Census Commissioner appealed to every 
citizen of Pakistan to see that he is enumerated properly 
and none of his family members are missed out, that 
nobody is enumerated more than once, and the 
enumerator is given a truthful answer to all the 
questions…1 
 
From the perspective of the Pakistani province of Sindh, Partition’s main impact was 
demographic:  as a territorial unit, unlike the Punjab or Bengal, the province’s recently-
acquired borders remained intact, but the existing balance between the different groups 
making up its pre-1947 population was upset by the arrival of Muslims in huge numbers from 
other parts of the subcontinent and, in due course, the departure of many of its non-Muslims 
for what had become India.
2
  After World War II growing support for the Muslim League’s 
manifesto in Muslim-majority provinces, had translated into an increasing proportion of 
Muslims in Sindh starting to welcome the idea of some kind of ‘Pakistan’ in the run-up to 
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independence, whether or not they understood this to involve the creation of a separate 
sovereign ‘homeland’ for South Asia’s Muslims. 3   But what took them, like other 
contemporaries across South Asia, by surprise was the sheer size of the population transfer 
that accompanied the process of partitioning British India into two independent successor 
states.  In this context, earlier sensitivities regarding the presence of ‘outsiders’ were revived, 
producing contradictions in the immediate post-Partition policies of Sindhi administrations:  
on the one hand, local Muslim politicians swung between welcoming incomers and cautioning 
against too many of them arriving; on the other, sometimes they urged non-Muslims to stay, 
while, on other occasions, facilitating (or even encouraging) the latter to leave.
4
  
 Sindhi ambivalence over what ‘Pakistan’ promised predated independence.  By early 
August 1947, despite support for the creation of a separate Muslim state in the Sindh 
Legislative Assembly, there was nervousness about what the future held for the province 
itself.  In the words of a contemporary observer: 
Many persons in Sind [sic] are beginning to wonder as to whether the 
establishment of the Pakistan Government in Karachi may not result in the 
province of Sind [sic] becoming swamped by an inflow of persons from other 
parts of the new Dominion, which will result in this province being reduced to an 
insignificant position.
5
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As this newspaper editorial suggested, the question of how independence would affect Sindh 
had already become a source of concern, with reports at the time (correctly it would appear) 
predicting that the issue was likely to cause serious friction in the longer-term.  Not 
surprisingly perhaps, numerical anxieties—usually regarding people but about other matters 
as well—then proceeded to underpin political debates and disagreements regarding Sindh's 
place in post-Partition Pakistan.   
 It was in this fluid—political and demographic—context that Pakistan’s first national 
census was carried out in 1951.  Conducted against the backdrop of Partition-related 
migration, it represented a mammoth bureaucratic undertaking on the part of the (still very 
new) Pakistani state, made tricky by the ongoing uncertainties generated by millions of people 
so recently on the move.  At a provincial level, Sindh presented the census organizers with a 
particular set of tricky challenges linked to the demographic upheavals that the region was 
still experiencing.  One specific difficulty that they faced was that census delimitation in the 
province had—in practice—to be based on very rough estimates of population, with potential 
inaccuracies linked to the continued arrival of migrants, their frequent changes in residence, 
and—importantly for local census officials—the lack of any proper record regarding the huge 
number of temporary dwellings that had been springing up since August 1947.  In 1949 there 
were still an estimated 45,000 to 95,000 refugees in unofficial camps, while at least the same 
number again were to be found living in temporary shelters, all of which posed complications 
for the collection of census data.
6
  Likewise—to judge from contemporary reports—in the 
event it proved easier to count people located in rural parts of Sindh than in towns and cities:  
the disruptions to urban life caused by Partition-related migration presented more practical 
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difficulties than in the (relatively more) settled countryside.
7
  The arrival of hundreds of 
thousands of muhajirs, together with over-spill migrants from other parts of Pakistan, posed 
enormous practical difficulties for administrators and enumerators at a time when the local 
bureaucracy lacked manpower and experience.   
 Without doubt, as the carrying-out of Pakistan’s 1951 census in Sindh highlighted, and 
as historians and other social scientists now acknowledge, Partition was an extended process 
that dragged on for many years in terms of the practical—nation-building—tasks that it posed.  
Pakistan may have come into existence at the stroke of midnight on 14/15 August 1947, but as 
a state created from scratch it remained a ‘work in progress’ for long after its founding 
moment.
8
  Its first census, therefore, needs also to be viewed as a deliberate attempt at state-
building, its effectiveness hinging not just on how systematically it categorised, enumerated 
and documented the population, but also on Pakistan’s recently-created citizens themselves 
sharing responsibility for the exercise working smoothly.  Building on Foucault’s argument 
that “modern ‘governmentality’ takes population as its object”,9 many now view enumeration 
as “a critical modality of governmentality”:  after all, “what kind of statistics are collected, 
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who collects them, and how they are used all affect the regulation of populations, techniques 
of accountability, and the formation of group identities”.10   
From this perspective, the decision to hold a census provided the Pakistani authorities 
at provincial as well as federal level with a valuable opportunity to project the role of the state 
as well as to communicate the responsibilities that they associated with being its citizens.  
Benedict Anderson in his influential Imagined Communities argued that censuses enable the 
state, or those who control and direct it, to view and quantify society:  for him, they were the 
way, for instance, in which a colonial state imagined and hence controlled its dominion.
11
  
But, it could also be maintained, that from the perspective of the people being surveyed, and 
all the more so where illiteracy is high, the act of conducting a census also brings citizens 
face-to-face with the state as the latter’s representatives engage in collecting and recording the 
required information.   In the words of an earlier (1941) British census official, “the cardinal 
fact [is] that it takes two to make a census, the enumerator and the citizen, and that of these 
two the role of the latter is the more fundamental and vital. The enumerator broadly is a 
scribe:  in any census it is the citizen's answers which are sought and are tabulated”.12  The 
reality proved to be very similar in post-Partition Sindh.  With extremely restricted literacy 
(the census itself eventually revealed a national rate in the vicinity of 13 percent), the 
collection of census data relied heavily on volunteer enumerators—frequently praised for their 
patriotic service
13—in effect taking the state along with their questionnaires directly, and what 
was in most cases for the first time, into people’s homes or living spaces, in the process 
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spreading the word about what the state now represented, or at least claimed that it did.
14
  As 
others have suggested in other contexts, one way that people learn to recognise themselves as 
members of a nation-state is by participating in the ritual of a national census.
15
 
 
Numerical anxieties in Sindh 
In the decades preceding independence and partition, like other parts of South Asia, local 
Sindhi politics had acquired a distinct numerical twist with numbers assuming a growing 
political significance.  Even without the drawing power of many major urban centres (the 
main exceptions being Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur), Sindh’s population grew rapidly in 
the early twentieth century, particular in the smaller towns and districts affected by the 
expansion of irrigation facilities.
16
  By the time of the penultimate colonial census in 1931, 
districts in Sindh were showing a faster rate of growth than in the average district elsewhere 
in Bombay Presidency, even though the increase in irrigation flowing from the completion of 
the mammoth Sukkur Barrage did not begin until 1932:  between 1921 and 1931 Sindh’s 
overall population density per square mile increased by nearly 20 percent, as compared with 
around 13 percent in other Bombay Presidency districts.
17
   
But, while the creation of a separate province in 1936 hinged in large part on financial 
arguments with the economic effect of the Sukkur Barrage a key point in its favour,
18
 the 
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separation campaign also acquired an ominously communal dimension thanks to the statistical 
fact that local Muslims outnumbered local non-Muslims by a ratio of roughly three to one.
19
  
Thus, demographic developments in Sindh combined with resentment at being administered 
by distant Bombay made at least some Sindhi Muslims increasingly sensitive to the realities 
of Bombay’s Hindu-majority and, in turn, this complicated their relations with non-Muslims 
closer to home.
20
  ‘Sind for Sindhis’ became a slogan of the campaign launched by local (in 
the main Muslim) politicians to secure their own ‘unattached’ province.  Concern at 
unemployment was translated itself into calls for recruitment to government service, from 
peon-level upwards, to be reserved for ‘Sindhis and Sindhis alone’. 21   And following 
separation itself, the presence of non-Sindhis in the province remained under close scrutiny in 
the provincial legislative assembly, with MLAs issuing periodic demands to limit 
employment opportunities open to so-called ‘outsiders’, in particular Punjabis whatever their 
religious affiliation.  Indeed, as I have discussed elsewhere, Sindhi politics during the decade 
before independence were greatly affected by the long-term consequences of colonial 
development policies that had encouraged the arrival of Punjabi settlers to work the lands 
released for production by irrigation schemes, and which helps explain Sindhi sensitivities 
towards the wave of newcomers generated by Partition.  In addition, the increased 
commercialisation of agriculture taking place in the 1930s accompanied as it was by the 
growing importance of small towns—which became key economic hubs—contributed to 
perceptions among at least some Sindhi Muslims that it was non-Muslims with extra-
territorial connections who were benefitting most from the new economic opportunities on 
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offer.  All this helped to fuel, and helps to explain, post-1947 Sindhi anxieties about the place 
of muhajirs in the province.
22
 
 After Partition, the continuing political significance of numbers in the province was 
symbolised by Sindh’s loss of Karachi in 1948, when financial number-crunching together 
with its newly acquired status as the country’s capital played an important role in the decision 
to convert the city into federal territory.  Accordingly in July 1948 the Karachi Municipal 
Area, together with the civil cantonment, other neighbouring cantonments and 44 surrounding 
villages (which had previously formed part of the district of Karachi) were amalgamated to 
form a centrally-administered enclave, leaving what remained of it, renamed Thatta District, 
in Sindh.   Power and responsibilities equating to those of a full-fledged province were 
transferred to an administrator.  As one observer commented, Sindh had been “beheaded”.23   
To a great extent, Sindh’s financial prospects—as a small province with limited resources—
directly depended on whether or not the federal authorities adequately compensated it for the 
loss of Karachi revenues, but in the view of a large number of provincial politicians this 
matter was not satisfactorily addressed.  By 1949, Sindh’s budget had reached a deficit of 
nearly ten million rupees, prompting its Finance Minister to observe in his 1949 budget 
speech: “we are reduced to the position of a very small province with very limited 
resources”.24  This deteriorating financial position meant that expenditure had to be cut—out 
of 88 development schemes, a quarter were abandoned and the remainder subjected to drastic 
review and revision.
25
   
 Numerical anxieties likewise entered the provincial political equation when during the 
same year—1948—there was intense disagreement over whether Sindh should absorb large 
numbers of overspill refugees from neighbouring Punjab.  By the start of that year nearly a 
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million displaced people remained in Punjabi refugee camps, including around 250,000 living 
in the open air.  To the federal government, relocating them southwards seemed like an 
obvious solution.  But Sindh’s political leaders rebuffed this idea.  Instead they insisted on a 
limit of 100,000—in the view of the then provincial Chief Minister MA Khuhro, Sindh could 
not absorb more than this number: in his words, “for every one Hindu that has left, two 
Muslims have come in”, and he rejected any further increase on the grounds of insufficient 
resource to cope with the influx.
26
  In response, the Federal Minister for Refugee 
Rehabilitation Ghazanfar Ali Khan argued that no province could impose any limit on its 
intake of refugees.  Condemning what he described as the narrow spirit being exhibited by the 
Sindh authorities, he warned against the “virus of provincialism” that, for him, contradicted 
both the teachings of Islam and the principles on which Pakistan had been fought for and won.  
If this “virus” went unchecked, he cautioned, it would “destroy the very foundations of our 
newly born state”.27  In the end, more than 200,000 refugees arrived. From early September 
onwards, they travelled at the rate of roughly 5,000 per day, 2,500 per train.  Meanwhile 
refugees from India, together with migrants from elsewhere in Pakistan, kept on arriving in 
the province; by 1949, more than 700,000 incomers had arrived there, with most heading for 
Karachi and many of the remainder settling in other urban centres in Sindh, a pattern that 
continued well into the 1950s.
28
   
 
Organising a National Census 
National censuses were nothing new in former British India.  As others have shown, the 
colonial authorities had made attempts to gather British India’s vital statistics from the early 
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nineteenth century onwards.
29
  Initially these had been periodic number-counting operations 
carried out usually for specific purposes and for limited areas, including annual provincial 
reports on medical relief that covered epidemic diseases (such as Presidency Board reports as 
early as the great epidemic of 1817), hospitals (beginning in 1851), and vaccination 
(beginning in 1861).  Famine too generated statistical reports, as did other matters concerning 
mortality such as in relation to the army, jails and certain key cities that went back to the first 
half of the nineteenth century.  In 1871, the first general census for the whole of British India 
at a given date was carried out.  India under British control became a ‘happy hunting ground 
[for] official investigating bodies’, which in turn developed a reputation for producing 
suitably voluminous official reports on a vast range of subjects.
30
  . 
 Censuses in British India, however, had also acquired a reputation for having to 
overcome a set of especially challenging practical obstacles.  As one commentator put it, 
“Imagine a massive, diversified subcontinent with hundreds of millions of people nearly all of 
whom are illiterate, most of them rural and some isolated in jungles or mountains, some 
harbouring superstitions inimical to census cooperation, some split by political and religious 
rifts … imagine all this and the difficulty of taking a census becomes apparent”.  Under these 
circumstances, the same source continued, it was “no wonder the hospital rate for census 
officials [had] been high”: the 1941 effort had reportedly sent four provincial superintendents 
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to hospital, leaving others “in a weakened condition” while “the [Census] Commissioner 
himself was ill eleven months out of the year”.31   
 Political complications could also on occasion intervene.  The 1931 Census, for 
instance, had coincided with and been confronted by Congress’s Non-Cooperation 
Movement, which had designated 11 January that year as ‘Census Boycott Sunday’.32  But, 
despite such complications, census officials in British India had importantly tended to regard 
their duties as transcending the mere gathering and reporting of statistics.  As well as 
interpreting census results, these officers also discussed their methods frankly, exposed their 
difficulties, shared their misgivings and expressed their plans and hopes:  they did not hide 
“behind a wall of infallibility”.33  By 1941, it had been recognised that the old-style omnibus 
report was now out-of-date, and so the then Chief Commissioner MWM Yeats proposed 
cutting back the scope of census volumes to include only such content as was deemed 
necessary for interpreting, and understanding, the tables: 
The great old Reports of the Indian Census—some of them classics for all time—
were written with the view to lead and guide all thinking in India in the matter of 
analysing and correlating the immense mass of figures which at every census was 
collected…but now everywhere we find a group of scholars who are competent to 
deal with the measurement of social phenomena, as in western countries, and the 
role of the counter of people has to approximate itself to that of his opposite 
number in England or America,—the humbler role of just collecting statistical 
data, doing as little as possible of writing and leaving the figures to speak for 
themselves.
34
 
 
 Pakistan’s political leaders, however, were not prepared just to let the numbers do the 
talking.  While Pakistan’s first exercise in nation-wide number-counting was influenced—at 
least to some extent—by the legacy of earlier censuses conducted under British rule, it was 
also affected by the challenges created by the after-effects of Partition and the broader 
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pressures associated with creating a new state.  From the moment of Pakistan’s creation, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and other politicians in different parts of the 
country hammered home messages about the need for the state—its representatives and its 
people—to pull to together on behalf of the nation. Shortly after independence, Jinnah used 
the occasion of Pakistan’s first Eid celebration in August 1947 to remind its citizens that 
No doubt we have achieved Pakistan, but that is only yet the beginning of an end. 
Great responsibilities have come to us, and equally great should be our 
determination and endeavour to discharge them, and the fulfilment thereof will 
demand of us efforts and sacrifices in the cause no less for construction and 
building of our nation than what was required for the achievement of the 
cherished goal of Pakistan. The time for real solid work has now arrived, and I 
have no doubt in my mind that the Muslim genius will put its shoulder to the 
wheel and conquer all obstacles in our way on the road, which may appear 
uphill.
35
 
 
 But despite such stirring speeches, the Pakistani authorities found themselves 
constrained on a practical administrative level by a shortfall in the number of experienced 
officials needed to manage day-to-day operations, made all the trickier by the lingering fallout 
from the demographic and economic dislocation produced by Partition.
36
  On the one hand, 
there was a desire and need to distance the state from its colonial predecessor; on the other, 
the independent state in practice often did not seem so very different—certainly from the 
perspective of many ordinary people engaging with it on a quotidian basis—from what had 
existed in the years leading up to 1947.  Official rhetoric, almost as soon as the moment of 
independence had come and gone, repeatedly laid stress on the fact that much had changed, 
but in many ways—from ration cards that harked back to wartime rationing, to the enduring 
blight of corruption and the continued reliance on politicians who lacked a proper democratic 
mandate—life in Pakistan in many ways bore an unsettling resemblance to that of pre-
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independence days.  Popular expectations were high thanks to the shared euphoria of 
independence, but by the early 1950s many people living in Pakistan were continuing to 
express disappointment at the everyday realities of a state that was still very much in-the-
making.
37
  
 From the outset, therefore, Pakistan’s first census was presented to the public as a 
hugely crucial nation-building test.
38
  For the Federal Minster of the Interior Khwaja 
Shahabuddin, speaking on Radio Pakistan in February 1951, its success hinged on teamwork 
between the public and the mass of volunteers who were to collect the necessary data: 
The gathering of all this information is a work that is being undertaken by a large 
body of unpaid workers.…To all these, Pakistan owes a debt of gratitude for their 
selfless labours [sic]…Throughout most of Pakistan the month of February will 
see them very busily employed.  When these gentlemen visit our homes…we 
must treat them with courtesy and respect as men who are doing a vitally 
important job which will be of the greatest help to everybody.
 39
      
 
In addition, the Minister went to great lengths to refute popular misconceptions that any 
information provided would be used to disadvantage individuals or that the census would 
arrive at a preconceived result:  “We are out to get at the truth whatever it may be…and I am 
sure that the people of Pakistan and particularly the census officers will ensure that everyone 
is included once and only once, and that slips are not made out for non-existent people”.40  In 
similar fashion, one correspondent in Dawn (who was keen to emphasise that refugees in 
Karachi could be “taken into full confidence and their full cooperation secured”) reminded 
other readers that “After all, [a] Census is held only once in a decade, and is a national 
service” and, accordingly, since it was clear that “this inescapable duty should not be thrust 
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upon unwilling workers”, he urged the Census authorities to take “steps to enlightened the 
general public about the general scheme and principles of Census operations”.41 
 But, like a lot of things that happened before and after August 1947, the first Pakistan 
census was organised in a hurry.  As its Commissioner EH Slade later commented in his 
official report, a “lack of time and the necessity for speed” created the “all-pervading 
atmosphere of the Census of 1951”.42  Thanks to disruptions and manpower shortages in the 
administrative services caused by the creation of two separate states at independence, a 
Census Act (Census Act (No. VII) of 1950) was not placed before Pakistan’s Constituent 
Legislative Assembly until late December 1949 when it was then rapidly processed, receiving 
the assent of the Governor General (by then Khwaja Nazimuddin) the following month.  On 1 
May 1950 a Ministry of the Interior press notice announced that the count would take place in 
February the following year.  At the same, the announcement also explained that “along with 
the traditional counting of heads, various useful data regarding religion, nationality, age, birth 
place, domicile, mother tongue, marital status, literacy, economic characteristics, agriculture, 
industries, and the migration of population’ would be ‘collected and tabulated for future use 
by the State and the public”.43   
 As no suitably-experienced officer was to be found in Pakistan’s already over-
stretched central bureaucracy,
44
 the post of Census Commissioner was advertised 
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42
  First Census of Pakistan:  Administrative Report, Part 1: The Census Commissioner’s Report 
(Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1953), p. 2 (hereafter CCR). 
43
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internationally, leading to Slade's appointment and arrival in Karachi in June 1950.
45
  This 
gave him just over six months in which to put the necessary mechanisms in place.
46
  In the 
interim, steps were taken to secure the nomination of suitable officers as Superintendents of 
Census Operations in each province, negotiations started with central ministries regarding the 
information that was to be sought through the census, and a census budget drawn up and 
approved by the Ministry of Finance.  Despite being given such a short space of time in which 
to deliver on his promise of carrying out a census by early 1951, Slade remained confident 
that his recent experience of organising a similar exercise under equally rushed circumstances 
in post-war Germany would ensure success, with “Pakistani enthusiasm and patriotism 
[substituting for] the efficiency of German officials and the compelling power of Military 
Government”.47  In July 1950 a conference in Karachi brought together representatives from 
all the relevant ministries to settle on the scope and general method of census operation to be 
deployed.  However, it did not take long for the officials involved to recognise that if the 
count was to take place as planned at the beginning of 1951, there was not sufficient 
opportunity to make any serious changes to the organisational methods that had been used in 
the previous 1941 census.  As a result, they agreed that “the main lines of the operation [had 
to be] kept as simple as possible”.48   
 Slade in his final census report eventually published in 1953 cautioned strongly 
against any future repetition of such a tight turn-around.  With the benefit of hindsight, he 
believed that this constraint had made the whole operation far more stressful than it had 
needed to be.  All the same, it is important to note that—despite the practical challenges posed 
by Independence and Partition—censuses during the British period had also tended to be held 
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at relatively short notice.  In turn this had prompted earlier census commissioners to criticise 
strongly what they had informally termed as the ‘Phoenix System’—namely, officials being 
appointed only a couple of years ahead of a census, carrying out the enumeration, tabulating 
the results and then disappearing along with the valuable experience that they had acquired in 
the process—which meant that each successive census operation under colonial rule had been 
unable to learn full lessons from the previous one.
49
  But, in practice, there was little 
opportunity in the run-up to Pakistan’s 1951 census to study what had and had not worked in 
the past, had Slade and team wished to do so. Circumstances did not allow this to happen.  For 
instance, Slade later confessed that when he had tried to track down any available records of 
how earlier censuses had been conducted in the territory that now comprised Pakistan, he had 
come across two godowns in the Secretariat compound in Lahore which, though they 
contained documents from the 1941 Census, had been locked up for eight years, serving “no 
better purpose than the nourishment of white ants”: 
 The only things of use were a damp and damaged but still complete set of Census 
Reports for 1931 for the Punjab.  These have been very difficult to obtain since 
partition [and so were very welcome] ... But the rest of the treasure...had by the 
mere effluxion [sic] of time become perfectly useless. We retained a few samples 
and agreed that the rest might be destroyed.
50
 
 
 In the event, some 200,000 enumerators, 16,000 circle supervisors, 1,770 charge 
supervisors, and 88 district census officers took part in what proved to be a massive state 
undertaking culminating in Census Night of 28 February-1 March.  Controlling the field 
operation were the offices of the Census Commissioner, five Provincial Superintendents, and 
the Chief Census Officer for the Federal Capital Area that had been so recently, and 
controversially, separated from the rest of the province of Sindh.  Interestingly, these officers 
were deliberately chosen from among senior provincial civil servants: 
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For the most part they were nearing the end of their active life.… None of them 
had any census experience to speak of and none were trained or had even read 
much about statistics.  Their acquaintance with mathematics was for the most part 
a memory of their student days.  Each of them, however, was an experienced 
administrator with a most intimate knowledge of his province, its people and its 
Governmental organisation.  They had many friends in all places and at levels in 
the Provincial civil service and among the public.  For the purposes of organising 
the enumeration, therefore, they were perfect.
51
 
 
In addition, around a quarter of a million volunteers—comprising mainly students, 
government employees, school teachers, Muslim League workers and Muslim League 
National Guards—were deployed by the Pakistani authorities, who divided the country into 
roughly 160,000 blocks, with ten blocks making up a circle, and every ten circles a charge.  It 
was the enumerator’s duty to visit every household in his area and obtain answers to a set of 
16 questions in respect of “every individual citizen”, covering 
… all the important demographic and economic characteristic, individual age, sex 
and marital status, nationality, religion, languages spoken, written and read, 
education and occupation.  Special questions were asked from the persons, known 
as Muhajirs, who had come into Pakistan leaving their home in other parts of the 
sub-continent of India as a result of Partition.  The agricultural and economic status 
of members of the civilian labour force were recorded, and certain questions asked 
to married women with a view to obtaining fertility data.
52
 
 
And once the period of enumeration itself was concluded, official reports took public pride 
how far the work involved had been “carried out with enthusiasm and a great measure of 
patriotic self-sacrifice”.  Praise was equally heaped on “the [apparently] friendly and willing 
cooperation of the public” together with the “tactful and pleasant attitude adopted by the 
enumerators”:53  as a later report claimed, “one only [had] to examine [the enumeration slips] 
to realise that their preparation was a labour of love” for the country.54   
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Census Operations in Sindh 
But a closer look at developments in Sindh and the recently-separated federal capital of 
Karachi suggests that the reality on the ground could prove very different to the positive 
officially-endorsed gloss put on the census operation before, during and after it was carried 
out.  The problems caused by the tightness of the census timetable together with insufficient 
numbers of experienced officials and willing volunteers proved especially acute in Sindh, and, 
hence, official reports singled out the province in general and the Federal Capital Area in 
particular as having presented a distinctive set of difficulties for those charged with carrying it 
out.   
 Unlike the 1941 census when local planning in Sindh had started more than two years 
ahead of the operation (HT Lambrick, who had headed up the provincial census authorities a 
decade earlier, had his staff in place from October 1939 onwards), the office of Muhammad 
Hashim, the Provincial Superintendent of the Census for Sind and Khairpur State, was given 
only nine months—a “dangerously short period”—in which to make the necessary 
preparations.  Hashim, himself only appointed in May 1950 (and before Slade himself had 
arrived in Pakistan), was forced to select his staff without knowing even what grade of pay 
they were to be offered.  It took until the end of November 1950—three months before the 
census was scheduled—for final clarification on this matter to be received, by which time 
both his first-choice Head Clerk and his Camp Clerk had—within five weeks of their 
appointment—rather inconveniently disappeared to study for the necessary qualifying 
examinations.  Moreover, while the Head Clerk was said to have “worked keenly in the hope 
that he was to be raised to a Gazetted Post and his pay doubled,… when he found out that the 
Census gave an increase of only Rs. 35/- over his basic pay, he lost interest and proceeded on 
19 
 
 
 
 
leave on medical certificate”.55  The understandable stress involved in finding and holding on 
to an adequate number of trained staff who did not believe that they were being paid 
sufficiently accentuated the difficulties caused by the lack of time, and for contemporary 
observers “it [was] a wonder that the Enumeration [in Sindh] was a success at all”. 56  
Relatively-speaking, therefore, with the provincial civil service having suffered a double 
disruption—caused first by Partition and then by the separation of Karachi that syphoned off 
potential men—the census operation here arguably faced a greater challenge thanks to the 
lingering impact of Partition than did other parts of Pakistan.  
 Based in one half of the Deputy Collector of Hala’s office, Hashim was also initially 
given responsibility for the Federal Capital Area alongside the eight districts that then 
comprised the province and Khairpur State.  Karachi, however, was in due course given its 
own separate census apparatus.  But thanks to the early confusion regarding who or what 
would be responsible for the census work in the city, its eventual own chief census officer 
AM Jafri only assumed his duties at the end of August 1950.  Throughout the process Jafri’s 
staff remained minimal, comprising three clerks of different grades, a typist and two peons.
57
   
 Much of the reason for this delay and resulting confusion was connected to problems 
linked to how to disengage or separate the newly-created FCA from its former provincial 
moorings.  As a result, the decision to treat the city and its surroundings as a separate census 
province with its own Chief Census Officer was only taken once the other provincial 
superintendents of census had already started their work.  The delay was also partly due to 
problems caused by the Karachi Municipal Corporation's assumption that, as during the 
previous 1941 Census when the then authorities had treated Karachi as a special case, the 
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Pakistan government would meet 50 percent of the expense involved.  But as the 1950 Census 
Act stipulated, municipal corporations were now financially responsibility for census work 
within their administrative areas.  In the case of Karachi, it seems to have been only once 
RAF Howroyd became Municipal Commissioner late in 1950 that Jafri and his team finally 
secured the all-important cooperation from Corporation employees.
58
   
 Karachi for census purposes was divided into two districts, with the Collector of 
Karachi given responsibility for the first that included cantonments and villages, while the 
second comprising the central parts of the city was placed under the direction of the 
Corporation’s chief officer. The number of census sub-divisions or ‘charges’, however, fell 
far short of what had originally been envisaged.  The Civil Cantonment, for instance, with an 
area of about four square miles and a population by now of over 100,000, remained a single 
unit, despite Jafri's efforts to sub-divide it into more manageable component parts.  On the 
other hand, ‘District No. 2’ was split into 44 charges, including the Port Trust, the Railway 
and the Customs areas as separate units.  What further complicated the operation was that the 
census in Karachi had originally been planned with existing wards as the basis for charges, 
but this proved impossible to coordinate on account of the huge increase in the city’s 
population since 1947.  Because municipal wards themselves varied considerably in size, and 
contained fluctuating numbers of inhabitants, the charges were not uniform and this created 
particular problems as far as accurate data collection was concerned.
59
   
 Elsewhere in Sindh, senior local officials—such as the Deputy Commissioner of 
Upper Sind Frontier (USF), various District Collectors and the Chief Officer of Hyderabad 
Municipality—assumed responsibility for local census operations.  Districts were then sub-
divided into charges, mainly on the basis on existing revenue talukas, mahals and municipal 
areas.  At this level, the key official was the mukhtiarkhar in rural areas and the chief officer 
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or secretary for towns. Charges were in turn split into ‘circles’, each placed under the control 
of a supervisor and split into blocks comprising—at least on paper—not more than 150 
houses in rural areas and fewer than this where possible in urban settlements.  An average of 
300-500 persons per block was adjudged to be the right number for a single enumerator to 
handle conveniently and efficiently.  In practice, the number of people in most blocks turned 
out to be much higher, averaging nearly 650 in the province as a whole and reaching around 
900 in the cities of Hyderabad and Khairpur.  But the census operation in the province was 
also marked by recruitment problems from the outset, first when it came to raising the 
necessary number of charge superintendents and then, once the central authorities had made a 
number of their own officers available for this duty, in securing local supervisors and 
enumerators. The initial plan had been to make very wide use of non-officials, but it proved 
very difficult to obtain enough of them on the necessary voluntary basis.  Frequently, as 
census officials reported, an early show of enthusiasm faded fast once volunteers learned of 
just how much hard work was going to be involved.  On top of this reluctance, many would-
be volunteers withdrew their offers of help when they found that they would not receive any 
payment for their efforts.
60
  In parts of Karachi, for instance, this triggered complaints that 
“neither public men nor officials were willing to devote part of their time to this national 
duty”:  out of 44 charge officers, the fact that only three were non-officials represented a “sad 
commentary” on the national spirit of public leaders in this part of the country.61 As the 
official census report for Karachi later complained:  
The Central Government and the Government of Sind nominated certain officers 
for this honorary work but many of these managed to avoid it on plea or another 
with the result that the Charge Superintendents were not fully appointed until late 
in January 1951, with enumeration due to start in less than a month.
62
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The difficulties encountered by Hashim and Jafri as far as attracting a sufficient 
number of charge superintendents proved to be nothing as compared with the monumental 
problem they faced when it came to recruiting the required quantity of volunteer enumerators 
and supervisors.  The initial 3,000 or so enumerators who initially offered their services in 
Karachi dwindled drastically once it was discovered that all they would receive for their 
involvement was out-of-pocket expenses and a sanad (certificate).  With only ten days left 
before the enumeration started, two charge superintendents in the city complained that they 
had still not secured a single supervisor or enumerator.  Despite the Collector of Customs, the 
Port Trust Chairman, the naval authorities and the Muslim League National Guard all coming 
“to the rescue at the eleventh hour”, a shortfall remained, which even the efforts of “devoted” 
helpers (including “an enthusiastic group of ladies who though not themselves holders of any 
census office [enumerators had to be male] rendered great help to the organisation”) could not 
disguise.
63
  
 Throughout the planning stage, directives generally trickled their way down to the 
officials and helpers involved.  In July 1950 a conference of district census officers took place 
in Hyderabad at which important points of procedure were communicated by Slade to his 
team.  These guidelines were then passed on to charge superintendents, who in turn took 
responsibility for training supervisors and enumerators.  Thereafter it became the duty of 
enumerators to arrange local meetings to explain to people in their blocks the object and scope 
of the census and to appeal for their cooperation.  Meanwhile, the authorities launched a 
massive publicity campaign in newspapers, on the radio and with the use of posters in public 
places in villages and towns alike.  In the city of Hyderabad, for instance, vans with loud 
speakers toured the streets while exhibits in local cinemas promoted the same instructions.  
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Radio Pakistan broadcast talks on why the census was so important to the country, which 
included Hashim addressing listeners in Sindhi on how to fill in the census slips.
64
   
 One of the enumerators’ preliminary duties was to prepare their blocks in readiness for 
the collection of census data.  As well as being supplied with house-list forms in both Sindhi 
and Urdu, they were given the necessary red and white paint with which daub numbers on the 
houses making up their respective blocks.  While it took until mid-September 1950 before the 
house numbering had started across the whole province, in most places the process 
encountered few problems, one exception being the town of Nawabshah where it was reported 
that (but not explained why) some of these numbers were rubbed off and so needed to be 
repainted.  However, in the main, completing this numbering task together with house listing 
took longer than anticipated.  Only in Dadu district was it achieved by the deadline of mid-
December.  Elsewhere (apart from USF and Larkana where it was finished by the end of 
December) it was not until January (less than a month before the start of the census period at 
the end of February) that these census preparations were completed (and even then lingering 
trouble with local Hurs in the desert portions of Khipro taluka of Thar Parker district meant 
that house listing there had to be carried out at the same time as enumeration a month ahead 
of the official census period
65
).  In Karachi, the purpose behind the household listing 
operation generated disquiet in view of legal complications associated with the ongoing 
scramble for living accommodation.  Under these circumstances, Slade was required to issue 
the following reassurance:   
 … telling the truth in the household list helps to make the population census 
valuable to Pakistan but it has no legal use and gives no information that could 
lead to action in individual cases.  No one need feel that the list could be used as a 
basis for any action by housing authorities.
66
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With accommodation still such a pressing issue in Karachi, and the city’s population 
continuing to swell, people there were clearly sensitive about how information about their 
living arrangements might be put to use by the authorities.  While large numbers of people 
remained unhoused in permanent dwellings, and as Zamindar’s work on the “economics of 
displacement’ in Karachi in particular has so persuasively demonstrated, individual refugees 
as well as groups representing them were quick to criticise what they viewed as corrupt 
practices as far as the allocation of housing was concerned.  They were also suspicious about 
attempts by the authorities to re-distribute evacuee property, often assuming that the system 
was being manipulated in favour of those with connections in the right places rather than on 
the basis of need.
67
 
 Unlike the 1941 census, when household lists in Sindh had been prepared first, 
followed by the numbering of houses and counting of household inhabitants over a three-
month stretch, these previously separate steps took place simultaneously in the run-up to the 
1951 count.
68
  And whereas the wartime census had aimed at enumerating people at their 
normal place of residence (that is, where they had lived for the previous six months), now the 
focus was simply on who happened to be in a household at the moment when the census was 
conducted.  With so much population flux in the period since Partition (and with continued 
movement into and out of Pakistani territory) any other approach was rejected on the grounds 
that it would risk overcomplicating the results.   
 The actual census period in Sindh also varied markedly between urban and rural areas.  
In the former, enumeration took place between 9 February and 1 March (Census Night), just 
as it did in most other parts of the country.  In Hyderabad city, for instance, the count was 
completed according to schedule without any apparent difficulty.  But in the countryside, this 
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period was initially extended to start from 1 January but, as it turned out, this could not 
happen as the necessary arrangements had not been fully completed by this earlier date.  In 
some parts of the province—USF, Larkana, Thar Parkar and Nawabshah districts—
enumerators encountered resistance when it came to giving information about women, for 
instance on matters concerning fertility or births, with the result that this data could not be 
collected for nearly 69,000 married or widowed women living there.
69
 
 Interestingly, census officials generally agreed that in contrast to so-called ‘illiterates’ 
who on the whole needed little persuasion to answer the census questionnaire, it was the 
urban ‘intelligentsia’ who did not always take the process seriously: in Karachi, “a Secretary 
to the Government had to be visited eight times at his house and office before his statement 
could be recorded”.70  Addressing a public meeting in federal capital on the first day of the 
census proper, Census Commissioner Slade called again for wholehearted public cooperation 
in the weeks ahead.
71
 After all, as both he and the Administrator of Karachi Hashim Raza 
emphasised, accurate census results were essential for planning how to build the new state: 
Pakistan is still young and impressionable; its future plans and programmes are 
still on the anvil and its constitution still unshaped.  We do not have to repair, 
renovate or demolish an old construction.   We have to raise an altogether new 
edifice, a task which, although stupendous in itself, is less intricate and more 
straight [sic].  Census results … are destined to play a significant role in our future 
development schemes and in shaping a near-utopian society.
72
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 On Census Night (28 February-1 March) itself, ‘a hush, ruffled only by gentle knocks 
and whispers of the enumerators, prevailed’. 73   The streets of Karachi were said to be 
completely deserted as census workers, permitted to hire rickshaws at government expense, 
went from house to house with a supply of individual questionnaires. Enumerators were also 
tasked with tracking down any individuals who might be at danger of being left out of the 
count because they lacked a permanent lodging place: in effect, the hunt was officially on for 
the city’s floating homeless population that, thanks to the accommodation shortage, still spent 
its night on footpaths on in other places not officially on record with the municipal authorities.  
What these unfortunates thought about the census remains unknown, but according to the 
final census report on the city at least, the results of the publicity campaigns that had 
accompanied the operation there proved—at least officially—to be “excellent”.  In its words, 
“the public became conscious of the Census and began to realise the importance of the 
operation; their minds were disembued [sic] of many false notions crediting the Government 
with ulterior motives”.74 But the reality was that for all the official effort to put a positive 
gloss on proceedings, the census operation had been subject to criticism.  In the run-up to the 
count, journalists, for instance, took great umbrage at being classed in a similar category to 
prostitutes, and had to be reassured that “This is not true…Prostitutes are nowhere mentioned 
in any part of the list.  Should they declare themselves as such, they will be entered in a 
separate category which relates to persons whose occupations are not otherwise classified.  
[After all] It must be remembered that in the census persons are classified in accordance with 
the description they themselves give”.75  In response, Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi, President of 
the Pakistan Newspaper Editors Conference (PNEC), made it clear that he did not regard this 
explanation as satisfactory: 
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 The principal point is:  is it or is it not a fact that the prostitutes and journalists 
appeared under the same major head of occupational classification? ... we in this 
country do not necessarily go by what is done in the West or by the UN.  Here we 
have our own distinct conception of good and bad. There, to be a dancer or a 
professional singer may mean nothing:  here it means a good lot.  Therefore I am 
not impressed by the plea put forward.
76
 
 
Likewise, during the census period itself, a letter-writer to the Karachi-published newspaper 
Dawn berated enumerators for wasting the public’s time by asking apparently meaningless 
questions:  
(to a lady) Are you married? A: “I am single”.  Q:  Where is your husband?  Any 
children? (To a gent): Are you married? A: “Bachelor”.  Q: How many children 
have you got? Have you any wives?  In some cases ladies have been asked “How 
many husbands have you got?”…The Census Commissioner should have been 
fully aware of the customs of all the communities residing in Pakistan before 
instructing the staff…When the enumerators ask “What is your religion?”, why 
shouldn’t they use their common sense?77   
 
In response, another correspondent suggested pointedly that actions would have spoken more 
effectively than words, and that the first letter-writer should “have served the Nation better by 
enrolling himself as an Enumerator instead of acting as an arm-chair critic indulging in mud-
slinging”. 78   One unanticipated problem emerged in terms of how to gather data from 
Karachi’s reportedly fairly large deaf and dumb community: 
Enumerators are finding it difficult to gather particulars about the deaf and dumb 
who are most homeless and have no neighbours who could tell particulars about 
them…Enumerators [have] had to leave census slips blank when they come across 
illiterate deaf and dumb citizens.
79
 
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
Interim census results were released as early as March 1951.  In the main, contemporaries 
suggested that these agreed pretty closely with earlier estimates made on the basis of the 1941 
census and having taking patterns of recent migration into account.  All the same, there were 
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suspicions that the official totals had been inflated, most likely for “political reasons”, in 
certain areas of what had now become Pakistan such as Sindh.
80
  On the other hand, as the 
Census Commissioner later reported, “there is in my mind a grave doubt as to whether such 
cities as Dacca, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan and especially Karachi were 100 per cent 
enumerated”.81  In the case of Karachi, where Partition generated arguably the most far-
reaching demographic fall-out in Pakistan, a recent (mid-1950) estimate of 1,177,226 given 
for the city’s inhabitants proved be quite close to the first provisional post-census figure of 
1,118,000 issued for the Federal Capital Area.
82
   
 Moreover, and arguably more significantly, the official census findings confirmed 
what the federal authorities wanted to hear: that Pakistan’s capital city was considerably more 
representative of the country-at-large than many contemporaries recognised (or alternatively 
wanted) it to be.  As a later Census Bulletin proudly announced, Karachi’s growth ranked as 
one of the new country’s “outstanding phenomena”, with the city placed in “the same rank as 
far as the number of inhabitants are concerned as Athens, Birmingham, Glasgow, Milan, 
Melbourne and Montreal”.  While “muhajirs from India [now accounted] for more than half 
the total population of the FCA”, this growth could not be attributed “to their arrival” alone, 
since “Government Servants, businessmen, skilled workers from all parts of Pakistan have 
been drawn to the capital and the departure of Hindus and Sikhs (the majority previous to 
Partition) has been cancelled out many times”. 83   Karachi, in effect, had moved on 
dramatically from its pre-1947 days, had no need of those who had left, and now ‘belonged’ 
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to Pakistan as a whole: the implicit conclusion, backed up by census findings, being that 
neither muhajirs nor Sindhis could claim it as their city alone.   
 Second, and again specifically in relation to Karachi, census findings provided the 
federal authorities with information that they needed to realign the city’s internal boundaries 
albeit retrospectively.  By the early 1950s, for instance, doubts had surfaced about the exact 
boundaries between the Municipal Corporation, the Port Trust and the civil cantonment area. 
The census process helped to settle these in a manner that appeared satisfactory to officials at 
the time, and so played a vital role in re-drawing the map of Karachi.  In addition, there were 
11 circles in the City Cantonment area (containing over 70,000 inhabitants) which census 
officials had, conveniently, decided belonged instead to the Corporation.  Hence, the census 
report had published a special table showing population according to sex, religion and the 
number of muhajirs in them based on redrawn ward boundaries even though these were not 
actually in existence at the time of the census itself.  By an extraordinary order dated 4 June 
1952 these were later confirmed as Municipal Corporation wards, based on the population 
figures produced by the census and the interim divisions on which the census enumeration 
was conducted.
84
   
  
 1941 1951 
Population  450,000 1,137,000 
Sindhi spoken as mother tongue (%)  61.2 8.6 
Urdu spoken as mother tongue (%)  6.3 50 
Hindu population (%) 51 2 
Muslim population (%)  42 96 
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Comparison of findings of 1941 and 1951 census findings for Karachi
85
 
 
 
 A third example of the political significance of the census was the way in which it 
exposed a shift in the languages and religions represented locally over the course of the 
decade since 1941.  Apart from emphasising that well over a third of Karachi’s inhabitants 
seem not to have spoken Sindhi as their mother tongue back in 1941—a likely reflection of 
the large presence of Gujarati-speakers there, many of whom had left for India by the time of 
the 1951 Census, as well as the demographic impact of wartime—and with only very few of 
its inhabitants having then declared themselves to be Urdu-speakers, the reconfigured reality 
captured in the census reports also highlighted the spectacular decline in the number of 
Hindus remaining in the city less than five years after Partition.  The ongoing sensitivity 
regarding Gujarati during Pakistan’s early years was revealed in a press notice issued before 
the census was carried out.  In response to anxiety among Gujarati-speakers in Karachi that 
their mother-tongue would be omitted from the list of languages printed on the census record 
slips, the Census Commissioner had felt it necessary to reassure them that there was no 
question of this data not being collected:  “the census record slip has a blank space specially 
left at the head of the last column for language classification” and enumerators had been 
instructed to fill in the relevant information.
86
  While the 1951 headcount underlined that 
Sindh contained the highest percentage of Hindus in its population as compared with other 
parts of West Pakistan, again the census’s official findings helped to reinforce the message 
that Karachi was now a Muslim, and by implication, a ‘Pakistani’ city. 
 Between 1941 and 1951, Karachi had added some 691,000 people to its inhabitants, 
representing a 158.4 per cent increase.  In the decade that followed, its population continued 
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to rise, by over 900,000 (80.5 per cent). A 1959 survey to determine the demographic 
characteristics of the city in 1959 placed the total at around 1.8 million; by the time of the 
1961 census it had topped two million.  In terms of percentage increases, however, the rate of 
growth slowed over the course of the 1950s, declining to 5.6 per cent per annum between 
1959 and 1961 as compared with 6.3 per cent between 1951 and 1956 and 10 per cent 
between 1941 and 1951.
87
  But this pattern was perhaps only to be expected.  The influx of 
migrants from India slowed down markedly in the second half of the 1950s, in large part 
thanks to the strict implementation of immigration rules.
88
  In July 1955, the federal 
government banned the unauthorised entry of Muslims from India into Pakistan.  In October 
1959, the Federal Capital Area was shifted to Rawalpindi, which also acted as a brake on 
Karachi’s expanding population growth, at least in the short term.89  But while immigration 
was declining, in-migrating continued to grow.  And just as important were fertility patterns.  
As one report explained, “Immigrants from India and people from other parts of Pakistan, 
attracted by better work opportunities, have moved into Karachi rapidly and are probably 
adopting many new ways of life in the metropolis.  But in regards to fertility, they apparently 
still think in their old ways and have not changed from their traditional pattern of high fertility 
…. administrators and city planners are usually aware and interested in the problem of 
migrants but the problem of excess births over deaths attracts less attention … The main 
current problem of population growth is therefore no longer a product of net migration but of 
procreation”.90 
 But we should not overlook the fact that, from the perspective of the state, the census 
also represented an important rite of passage:  as a later press release commented, 
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A population census is an essential requirement of modern administration, 
amounting as it does to a stock taking of the most valuable asset of the Nation, the 
people.  Censuses have been taken from time immemorial, but in this age of 
planning, when the people of Pakistan are girding themselves to ameliorate their 
own condition, the nation needs to know its own strength and quality, the social 
status of its inhabitants, and their educational, cultural and economic conditions. 
Information is required regarding languages, occupations and technical ability to 
man the services and industries.  The first Census of Pakistan was therefore 
planned to measure these resources and assess the ability of the country to 
shoulder its own burden.
91
 
 
But, as this article has sought to show, it is also important to acknowledge how far the census 
operation in Sindh exposed key political and bureaucratic challenges facing the Pakistani 
state, at both federal and provincial level, in its efforts to establish itself after 1947.  The way 
in which the census was carried out demonstrated the importance that the state attached to the 
operation as a way of developing and reinforcing its relationship with its new citizens as well 
as its central role in constructing and knowing whole populations as objects of management 
and government.
92
 Thus, official and non-official reactions to the census help us to understand 
the shaping of state-endorsed as well as more popular understandings of ‘Pakistan’ during a 
crucial period of political transition there.  This conclusion chimes with arguments put 
forward by Kamal Sidiq in his study of more recent strategies pursued by so-called illegal 
immigrants to obtain citizenship.  Just as Sidiq cautions strongly against regarding citizenship 
as simply a top-down construction (‘citizenship from above’)—pointing instead to how far 
individuals can subvert such ordering by accessing rights through alternative, extra-legal 
channels—so to censuses need to be viewed as bottom-up exercises or at least occasions when 
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those being counted may or may not choose to cooperate with the state and its ‘everyday’ 
representatives.
93
   
 Thus, as this article has highlighted, contextualising the 1951 census allows us to 
gauge the significance of number-counting from the perspective of early state-building efforts 
in Pakistan, and what these meant at the local level, in this case Sindh and in particular the 
city of Karachi located there.  In time, the legacies of this first census—above all, the 
officially-verified increase in the number of declared Urdu speakers—came to bear upon 
federal and provincial government policies, with the census figures themselves also 
increasingly appropriated or undermined by the various communities now living in this part of 
Pakistan.  By the early 1970s, these pressures came to a head, fuelling growing tension 
between Sindhi and muhajir groups in provincial political life.  Sindhi interests, it seemed, 
now clashed very openly with those of former refugees from India.  First, language became a 
clear-cut bone of contention when the provincial Pakistan People’s Party ministry, led by 
Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, introduced the Teaching, Promotion and Use of Sindhi Language Bill in 
July 1972, making Sindhi a compulsory subject at school level and also raising the prospect of 
it taking the place of Urdu in local government offices and courts.  Language riots followed.  
Then, to further complicate the picture, a new federal quota system for government 
employment was introduced in 1973, which split Sindh’s share of just under 20% of federal 
jobs into two sections—rural (11.4%) and urban (7.6%)—with Sindhis largely falling into the 
first category and muhajirs the second, a move that in practice threatened the latter’s access to 
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federal jobs, and formed part of the backdrop to the emergence of the Muhajir Quami Mahaz 
(MQM) as a key political force in Sindh’s cities and towns in the 1980s.94   
Finally, as Akhil Gupta has emphasised in Red Tape—his hugely-influential 
anthropological study of present-day bureaucratic practices in India—we must remember that 
“states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses but powerful sites of symbolic and 
cultural production that are themselves always culturally represented and understood in 
particular ways”. 95  Indeed, exploring how Pakistan’s first census was conducted in Sindh 
reinforces the importance of thinking about the ways in which statistical data is collected and 
the mechanisms that determine the effectiveness of this biopolitical exercise. Viewed from the 
perspective of twenty-first century Pakistan and bearing in mind the combination of political 
and logistical problems that has hampered census operations in the region for nearly twenty 
years—Pakistan’s long-awaited latest census promised for 2016 having (at time of writing) 
yet to materialise—number-counting, together with the politics of number-crunching, 
continues to represent a matter of logistical and numerical anxiety for the Pakistani state and 
its citizens alike.
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